The International Association of Small Broker Dealers and Advisors http://iasbda.posterous.com Visit www.iasbda.com for more information posterous.com Tue, 03 Jan 2012 11:18:48 -0800 Brokerage Firm Sale Runs Into Private Securities Transaction Issue. http://iasbda.posterous.com/brokerage-firm-sale-runs-into-private-securit http://iasbda.posterous.com/brokerage-firm-sale-runs-into-private-securit   This FINRA case brought to our attention by Bill Singer symbolizes the wide divide between small firms and big firms and the ongoing debate about the efficient use of regulatory resources.An outline of the facts are as follows.
Small bd wishes to sell firm to one of its rr's
  • RR tells firm he will raise money among a few investors with promissory notes
  • Firm agrees to plan and rr sells 6 notes in the amount of $980,000.
  • Firm is then penalized for not putting promissory notes on its own books and records
  • Owner and another principal are suspended for 10 days and fined $15,000
  • How often are senior executives of big firms suspended for significantly more serious violations?
  • Could this firm have been warned and the notes placed on its books after the fact ?
  • Would the investors have been better protected in doing so and these regulatory resources devoted to more productive use?.
  • Wasn't this the equivalent of a self directed or direct distribution?
     
    Peter J.Chepucavage
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting Group, LLC
    1620 I Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com
    -----Original Message-----
    From: BrokeAndBroker [mailto:rrbdlawyer@brokeandbroker.com]
    Sent: Tuesday, January 03, 2012 9:31 AM
    To: Peter Chepucavage
    Subject: Brokerage Firm Sale Runs Into Private Securities Transaction Issue. Muni-Bond Guilty Pleas. JOBS!!!

    Brokerage Firm Sale Runs Afoul of 
    FINRA Private Securities Transaction Rule
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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Thu, 15 Sep 2011 06:32:00 -0700 Quest CE for Firm Element http://iasbda.posterous.com/quest-ce-for-firm-element http://iasbda.posterous.com/quest-ce-for-firm-element

      

     

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    This electronic message transmission contains information from Quest Continuing Education Solutions, Inc, which may be confidential or privileged. The information is intended to be for the use of the individual or entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this transmission is prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify us immediately by reply email and delete the original message. Thank you.

     

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 01 Aug 2011 10:48:00 -0700 firm element provider http://iasbda.posterous.com/firm-element-provider http://iasbda.posterous.com/firm-element-provider

     

    ole0.bmp

    <http://www.firmelement.com/>"

    Please advise firm element that you found them on IASBDA.We do not have experience with them but believe they should be looked at when addressing your firm element requirements.

     

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting Group, LLC
    1620 I Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

    Ole0

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Fri, 03 Jun 2011 08:10:28 -0700 FILE NO.4-627 SHORT SALE REPORTING STUDY REQUIRED BY DODD-FRANK-ACT SECTION 417(a)(2) http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no4-627-short-sale-reporting-study-requi http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no4-627-short-sale-reporting-study-requi The International Association of Small Broker Dealers and Advisors

    1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 210 ole0.bmpWashington, DC 20006

    202-785-8940 ext. 108

    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com <mailto:pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com>

    www.iasbda.com

    The International Association of Small Broker-Dealers and Advisers ,www.iasbda.com appreciates the opportunity to respond to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's request for comments (76 Fed. Reg. 26787 (May 9, 2011)) on the short selling

    studies required by Section 417(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Act). We wish to comment on the need for the public and the regulators to understand exactly what is happening to our markets in real time. Since the implementation of Reg SHO there has been slow but steady progress in the Commission's understanding of the negative impact of abusive short selling .The Congress has finally required a focus which has been recommended by many ie real time reporting. Whether its done by pilot or permanent rule we believe that the public needs to know when sellers are selling stock they do not own. whether legitimately or abusively. Recognizing that there are costs involved we believe that small to medium firms should receive this transparency first.

    We urge the SEC to adopt rules that require the exchanges and all trading platforms to report total short and long volume through the Consolidated Tape in real time as a simple and inexpensive means to promote needed transparency in the markets. we begin by noting however that the question of whether abusive short selling exists has long been answered and should not be asked in this proposal. Cases brought and statements by the CEO's of major banks and legislators have made a strong argument in this regard.

    This simple requirement would help the SEC to regulate by bringing sunlight to a dark area. Aggregate volume is already reported in real time. Prompt reporting of aggregate long and short trading volume by security will accomplish the following:

    Congress, the SEC and other regulators will be able to monitor, assess, and respond to market events and discourage manipulative trading. Investors and analysts will better understand stock activity and stock prices. Issuers will be able to reply with more certainty to questions about the nature of trading in their stock. Wall Street firms and hedge funds will be able to use this short volume data to dispel any inaccurate myths regarding short sellers and short sales. Academics will have more complete and timely data with which to analyze market microstructure.

    Importantly, this requirement would not reveal or compromise individual traders’ positions and strategies. the commission should
    require that all trades printed to the Tape be marked “short”, “market maker short”, “buy” or “buy-to-cover.” It is critical that this requirement apply to trades on all exchanges. It is even more critical that this information be available in times of financial crisis or terrorist attacks. The Overstock comment letter of May 19,2011 details a recent Defense Department report on Economic Warfare noting that abusive short selling was an important factor in the 2008 financial crisis. We believe the commission has consistently underestimated the national security need  for abusive short selling protection and ask whether the Commission's response to the 911 attacks may have been different if this type of reporting were in place.We also ask why this national security area was not part of the request for comment.

    The cost to implement real time reporting on the Tape is minimal because currently SEC Regulation SHO requires that all trades be reported short/long, so this information is already collected by the exchanges at time of execution. As Michael Gitlin of T. Rowe Price told the SEC short selling roundtable :
    The real time tagging and display of short sale executions on the consolidated Tape would provide market participants with a more in-depth understanding of trading activities in any given security on any given day. By marking short sale executions as short on the consolidated Tape, we are creating an equal and fair marketplace whereby long sales would necessarily be recognized as having been sold long . . . We believe the benefits of the Consolidated Tape reporting for short sales outweigh any additional costs.

    Given the severity of the economic crisis that resulted from the emergence and manipulation of exotic and opaque trading practices, there should not be serious objections to more transparency and information for investors, issuers, regulators, Congress academics,and anti-terrorism personnel.. Options activity, both puts and calls, is already disclosed to the market at the time of trade. Retail trades (short/long) are known to brokerage firms at time of execution. Real time tagging and disclosure of short and long sales by ticker would level the playing field for all investors. Additionally, short and long sale disclosure by ticker is less onerous than short sale disclosure by firm (or client).

    While some argue that opponents of abusive short selling wish to treat short selling differently than long buying, that is not our purpose. In fact, it is just the opposite. We advocate short reporting be done the same as long reporting. The SEC should require full transparency for both, especially in volatile or crash markets. The recent flash crash is troubling not only because of its size, but more importantly because neither regulators nor investors understand it. The possibility that short selling could have played a part in the flash crash requires the full and real-time transparency for which I am advocating.

    Issuers who were severely impacted should know the dynamics of long and short selling. Investors should know whether large amounts of aggressive short selling are legitimate or abusive. The disclosure we are advocating would allow the private sector to join with the regulators in their enforcement efforts. It may also allow private sector issuers to alert the SEC to unusual patterns, including naked short selling coupled with rumor mongering. Those closest to a stock may be able to spot subtle trading pattern differences and inform regulators and/or initiate civil action. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 4,2010 at page C1 the testimony of certain veteran traders at the recent SEC roundtable on high speed trading:
    “Some fast-moving computer-driven investment firms are getting an edge by trading on market data before it gets to other investors, according to market players and researchers who have studied the trading. The firms gain that advantage by buying data from stock exchanges and feeding it into supercomputers that calculate stock prices a fraction of a second before most other investors see the numbers. That lets these traders shave pennies per share from trades, which when multiplied by thousands of trades can earn the firms big profits.” See also <<http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10808036>>.

    Some of these veteran traders went so far as to test and prove their theories by various bait and trap initiatives with counter parties. Clearly, the private sector can be helpful when it has information about suspicious trading patterns. Finally we are particularly concerned about the continuing practice wherein hedge funds publicly attack issuers and then urge the commission to start an investigation. If this is legitimate activity why shouldn't the trading in those targeted securities be transparent? The question here is not why transparency should be required but why not.

    Sincerely,
    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108

    Top of Form 1

    ole1.bmp

    Bottom of Form 1


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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Tue, 01 Mar 2011 11:34:17 -0800 File No.: S7-05-11 Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no-s7-05-11-reporting-by-investment-advi http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no-s7-05-11-reporting-by-investment-advi

    http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/ia-3145.pdf

    This comment is directed at only one very specific issue in the lengthy release best summarized by the fact  that the information requested should and could include naked short sales. Our clients believe this is a unique opportunity to obtain the type of information that has been missing from hedge funds throughout the entire subprime crisis and the entire debate about abusive short selling in spite of Reg. SHO.Short selling may contain the seeds of systemic risk and abusive short selling even more so. We believe that these entities should be asked to report on  their naked short sales even if they are not deliberate. The release specifically says they are interested in leverage and collateral practices that may have systemic implications. It specifically asks whether there are other ways hedge funds could create systemic risk? the release asks about the net counterparty credit exposure of five largest trading counterparties.It could therefore be assumed that net exposure would include short selling but its more complicated then looking at net numbers. Naked short sales would completely corrupt any net analysis. As explained by Professor Branson:

    As with the condemnation of “distort and short” manipulations, many market participants condemn the practice of naked short selling. In theory, if short sellers do not have to, or simply do not, deliver shares which they have purported to sell, short interest in a stock can exceed the total number of shares outstanding. On a more realistic scale, when naked short selling takes place, short interest in a stock can mount rapidly, exerting excessive downward pressure on a stock’s price. Combined with the broadcast of false rumors, or an organized distort and short campaign, naked short selling can push a stock’s price so far down that the price level has no connection with underlying economic realities. Buyers of such stocks, deprived of delivery, do not have the right to receive dividends or to vote shares they have purchased. In the view of nearly every market participant, naked short selling, like the spread of false rumors, is a “hit out of bounds,” not considered to be within the boundaries marking a level playing field.39VIRGINIA LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW VOLUME 5 FALL 2010 NUMBER 1, MORE MUSCLE BEHIND REGULATION SHO? SHORT SELLING AND THE REGULATION OF STOCK BORROWING PROGRAMS, Douglas Branson fn 14

    Short selling presents the potential for unlimited risk because unlike long sales where you can lose your entire investment, short sales present the possibility of infinite losses. George Soros explains the potential for systemic risk as follows. With the help of this new paradigm, the poisonous nature of CDS can be demonstrated in a three-step argument. The first step is to acknowledge that being long and selling short in the stock market has an asymmetric risk/reward profile. Losing on a long position reduces one's risk exposure, while losing on a short position increases it. As a result, one can be more patient being long and wrong than being short and wrong. This asymmetry discourages short-selling.

    H:\reg sho final\soros short sales.mht 
    Naked short selling done opportunistically avoids costs and therefore adds an incentive to the systemic risk .Numerous commenters have asked the commission to provide more visibility on naked short selling and Dodd Frank requires a study on real time reporting. But this is an added benefit opportunity where such information is complementary if not fundamental to the main purpose of the request. We have often argued that the current requirement of Reg Sho that mandates a locate but not a borrow will promote opportunistic short selling in a financial panic or terrorist attack. Relatively modest penalties that have been imposed so far would only strengthen the calculation that money is to be made and worst case scenario is the regulators will require a give back years later. Thus the proposed information gathering exercise should be especially sensitive to abusive short sales and try to obtain as much information as possible on them.

    The determination of naked shorts should be decipherable through both buy-ins and shorts where no borrowing costs are incurred. Reporting entities can if they choose to distinguish inadvertent naked shorts but an explanation must be provided. If an entity cannot report then it can provide an explanation as to why it cannot do so and inability to do so should be a major concern in risk management. A recent article on the trading of GM naked CDS  confirms Soros concern and suggests that without this type of information the systemic threats risk can be seriously understated.

    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704430304576170710897188504.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection
    Lawmakers and regulators have blamed credit derivatives for exacerbating the financial crisis and helping bring down companies like American International Group </public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=AIG> Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Investors who bought "naked CDS" to bet on the likelihood of default, rather than to hedge risk from other investments, are credited with worsening the liquidity crisis that gripped those financial powerhouses, prompting calls for tighter regulation of the industry.

    While this subject can be debated,the need to know how large these positions are cannot be debated? As Soros concluded:
    Taking these three considerations together, it's clear that AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others were destroyed by bear raids in which the shorting of stocks and buying CDS mutually amplified and reinforced each other. The unlimited shorting of stocks was made possible by the abolition of the uptick rule, which would have hindered bear raids by allowing short selling only when prices were rising. The unlimited shorting of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. The two made a lethal combination. And AIG failed to understand this.


    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Tue, 22 Feb 2011 11:05:49 -0800 Michael J Armelin resume_NEWEST 2 http://iasbda.posterous.com/michael-j-armelin-resumenewest-2 http://iasbda.posterous.com/michael-j-armelin-resumenewest-2

    Michael J. Armelin

    4530 Warren Street, N.W.

    Washington, D.C.  20016-2442

    (202) 362-1680 (h) – (202) 355-4185(c)

    michael.armelin@gmail.com

     

    SUMMARY

    Broker-dealer investigator/project manager experienced at conducting on-site examinations of sales, underwriting, trading practices and other compliance reviews regarding broker-dealers and investment advisors.

     

    Capabilities include: investigating the financial/operational condition of firms, conducting pre-examination compliance reviews, assisting in responding to regulatory inquiries, investigating customer complaints/terminations for cause and keeping current about regulatory changes. Also, strong analytical skills, experience reviewing systems of internal controls/risk management and identifying significant, novel sales practice and fraud cases. Industry experience includes active Series 7, 24 and Insurance Licenses, along with PC skills and systems knowledge.

     

    Professional Experience --Assistant Director, Department of Enforcement, FINRA (1991 – 2010)

     

    *Teamed with the Strategic Programs Unit in identifying significant, novel cases which warranted a formal review.

    *Responsible for reviewing the initial aftermarket trading and other trading data for Small Cap IPOs to identify activity for further analysis  

      by an advanced team. This program resulted in approximately 50 formal reviews each year and led to multiple actions.

    *Completed initial review and developed follow-up plan for identifying and reviewing fee-based accounts maintained by broker-dealers.

      Resulted in appropriate actions against broker-dealers and RRs.

    *Primary reviewer of sales practice issues relating to lock-up agreements in IPOs sold by some 30 broker-dealers. 

    *Discovered the first analyst case involving  research reports by a broker-dealer.

    *Planned and led the review of telemarketing issues involving IPOs by broker-dealers.

    *Represented the Department of Enforcement at regular meetings within FINRA, with the SEC and with other regulators to identify and

      address emerging issues in the securities industry.

     

    Additional Roles Included:

     

                Assistant Director, Member Regulation, FINRA

    *Responsible for managing the Compliance Department’s team of over twenty staff members and administrative staff, who supported the

      examination and sales practice programs carried out in FINRA’s fourteen regional offices.

    *Resolved real-time questions from District supervisors relating to on-site reviews.

    *Identified new regulations for incorporation into examination modules.

     

                Regional Coordinator, Member Regulation, FINRA

    *Planned and conducted on-site reviews of broker-dealers, on a continuing basis, as needed.

    *Review responsibility included oversight of the examination programs conducted by my assigned regional offices, along with monitoring

      the financial and operational condition of broker-dealers in the regions.

    *Participated in preparing responses to SEC comment letters following an SEC oversight review of examination programs carried out by

      FINRA’s regional offices.

    *Responsible for preparing written notification to SIPC detailing the condition of members experiencing financial or operational problems.

     

                Senior Examiner, Member Regulation, FINRA, New York

    *Conducted on-site examinations of broker-dealers and promoted to the Senior Examiner position in New York responsible for the

      examination of general securities firms.

    *Examined a broker-dealer planning to go public – discovered net capital and operational difficulties and the IPO was withdrawn.

    *Investigation disclosed a member co-underwrote an IPO with a non-member resulting in disciplinary action.

     

    Education

                Bachelor of Science (Economics) – Mount St. Mary’s University

                Master of Business Administration – American University

    Selected Recognition

                FINRA Gold President’s Award, 2003

                FINRA Team Award, 2005

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 14 Feb 2011 12:52:16 -0800 Markets in Trouble http://iasbda.posterous.com/markets-in-trouble http://iasbda.posterous.com/markets-in-trouble   We have been discussing the SEC's Small Business Forum with the staff and suggesting that they might be more inclusive in their planning and selection of panel members. We have also suggested that the forum might be held in other cities in addition to D.C.The attached NYT 's article does not bode wall for big firms and if true, is deadly for small firms raising capital. Others especially Steven Pearlstein of the Post have made similar points about the decline of the U.S. economy and markets. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/12/AR2011021202503.html  and

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/01/AR2011020106617.html. See also how Michael Lewis describes how the Irish government, press and financial sector conspired to convince themselves that Dublin was the new London. <http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103> thereby destroying their markets and their economy.

    We think there is a need for renewed emphasis on excessive small business regulation especially the issue of finders and business brokers and the need for a robust small business capital markets exchange.

    Op-Ed Contributor
    Wall Street’s Dead End
    By FELIX SALMON
    Published: February 13, 2011 Top of Form 1

      Bottom of Form 1

      THE stock market has been big news in recent days. Last week’s report that Deutsche Börse, a giant German exchange, intends to buy the New York Stock Exchange <
    http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/nyse-euronext-and-deutsche-borse-in-merger-talks/?ref=newyorkstockexchange>, creating a company worth some $24 billion, arrived shortly after the Dow broke the 12,000-point barrier for the first time since before the financial crisis.

    These developments drew headlines because they seemed to exemplify significant trends in the American economy. But look at America’s stock exchanges more closely, and there’s less to them than meets the eye. In truth, the stock market is becoming increasingly irrelevant - a trend that threatens the core principles of American capitalism.

    These days a healthy stock market doesn’t mean a healthy economy, as a glance at the high unemployment rate or the low labor-market participation rate will show. The Tea Party is right about one thing: What’s good for Wall Street isn’t necessarily good for Main Street. And the Germans aren’t buying the New York Stock Exchange for its commoditized, highly competitive and ultra-low-margin stock business, but rather for its lucrative derivatives operations.

    The stock market is still huge, of course: the companies listed on American exchanges are valued at more than $17 trillion, and they’re not going to disappear in the foreseeable future.

    But the glory days of publicly traded companies dominating the American business landscape may be over. The number of companies listed on the major domestic exchanges peaked in 1997 at more than 7,000, and it has been falling ever since. It’s now down to about 4,000 companies, and given its steep downward trend will surely continue to shrink.

    Nor are the remaining stocks an obvious proxy for the health of the American economy. Innovative American companies like Apple and Google may be worth hundreds of billions of dollars, but most of them don’t pay dividends or employ many Americans, and their shares are essentially speculative investments for people making a bet on how we’re going to live in the future.

    Put another way, as the number of initial public offerings steadily declines, the stock market is becoming little more than a place for speculators and algorithms to compete over who can trade his way to the most money.

    What the market is not doing so well is its core public function: allocating capital efficiently. Apple, for instance, is hugely profitable and sits on an enormous pile of cash; it is thus very unlikely to use its highly rated stock to pay for any acquisitions. It hasn’t used the stock market to raise money since 1981, and there’s a good bet it never will again.

    Meanwhile, the companies in which people most want to invest, technology stars like Facebook and Twitter, are managing to avoid the public markets entirely by raising hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars privately. You and I can’t buy into these companies; only very select institutions and well-connected individuals can. And companies prefer it that way.

    A private company’s stock isn’t affected by the unpredictable waves of the stock market as a whole. Its chief executive can concentrate on running the company rather than answering endless questions from investors, analysts and the press.

    There’s much less pressure to meet quarterly earnings targets. When the stock does trade, the deals can be negotiated quietly, in private markets, rather than fall victim to short-term speculation from the high-frequency traders who populate public markets. And companies love how private markets allow them to avoid much of the regulatory burden of being public.

    That burden comes largely from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was created in the wake of the 1929 stock-market crash to protect small investors. But if the move to private markets continues, small investors aren’t going to need much protection any more: they’ll be able to invest in only a relative handful of companies anyway.

    Only the biggest and oldest companies are happy being listed on public markets today. As a result, the stock market as a whole increasingly fails to reflect the vibrancy and heterogeneity of the broader economy. To invest in younger, smaller companies, you increasingly need to be a member of the ultra-rich elite.

    At risk, then, is the shareholder democracy that America forged, slowly, over the past 50 years. Civilians, rather than plutocrats, controlled corporate America, and that relationship improved standards of living and usually kept the worst of corporate abuses in check. With America Inc. owned by its citizens, the success of American business translated into large gains in the stock portfolios of anybody who put his savings in the market over most of the postwar period.

    Today, however, stock markets, once the bedrock of American capitalism, are slowly becoming a noisy sideshow that churns out increasingly meager returns. The show still gets lots of attention, but the real business of the global economy is inexorably leaving the stock market - and the vast majority of us - behind.

    Felix Salmon is the finance blogger at Reuters.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Wed, 09 Feb 2011 09:16:39 -0800 File-no.7-04-11 Net Worth standard for accredited investors http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no7-04-11-net-worth-standard-for-accredi http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no7-04-11-net-worth-standard-for-accredi

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

     -----Original Message-----
    From:   Peter Chepucavage 
    Sent:   Wednesday, February 09, 2011 12:09 PM
    To:     'rule-comments@sec.gov'
    Cc:     brad smith; brock
    Subject:        File-no.7-04-11 Net Worth standard for accredited investors

    The International Association of Small Broker Dealers and Advisors

    1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 210 ole0.bmpWashington, DC 20006

    202-785-8940 ext. 108

    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com <mailto:pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com>

    www.iasbda.com

    The International Association of Small Broker-Dealers and Advisers,www.iasbda.com submits the following comments on the above referenced amendments. We wish to focus on the sole issue of how to treat debt incurred on a home and assets purchased with that debt or as the release calls it proceeds of debt secured by primary residence incurred to invest in securities. Borrowing on one's house has become an American tradition and needs to be rationalized in this proposal. The release notes the uncertainty over the use of such borrowings to purchase other assets and whether those assets need to be included in the calculation .A person with a home valued for tax purposes at $1,000,000 may have borrowed as much as $750,000 of net equity and its logical to exclude the other 25%  from their net worth. But the release seems to allow the assets purchased by that $750,000 to be included for net worth purposes because of the complexity of tracing the assets.. This arguably seems to encourage the owner to borrow and diversify and thus defeat the intent of the legislation. A more logical reasoning would suggest that the amount of borrowings must also be excluded from net worth to offset their purchases, thereby excluding the entire value of the house as presumably intended. But that may be an excessive restraint . It seems logical that if other assets are to be counted, the loan against the house, must be deducted from net worth to avoid doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.

    The release notes and agrees with NASAA'S concern that investors should not be encouraged to borrow on their house to invest in private placements. Such reasoning would seem however to deny the existence of the housing crunch that has occurred in the last two years. It would be perfectly suitable to draw down home equity to diversify into for example a high dividend energy offering. The question therefore is how to treat home equity debt . Congress was correctly concerned about the sensitive nature of home equity and the potential for abuse of it .It seems therefore that the rule must consider it more specifically then the proposal does. If the proceeds were used wisely then deducting the amount of the loan would not create  a barrier. If they were used unwisely then  the underlying home equity should not offset the entire loan. The question is whether equity underlying a home loan should completely offset the loan in the calculation. To do so seems to defy the intent of Congress and encourage liquefying home equity. Perhaps therefore a haircut can be wisely used to insure that the intent of Congress is fulfilled. A "25% of the loan' deduction" might serve that purpose. Private placements are very important to small business and should be encouraged. But Congress has spoken and the Commission should try to arrive at a proposal that fully considers home equity debt without discouraging this vital capital raising regulation. Small business does not gain by encouraging the unwise use of home equity.

    An explanatory example might be the use of the above referenced home equity loan to buy a vacation house or a limited partnership. How much of those assets should be added to net worth without deducting the home equity loan that facilitated them? Finally as we have previously noted this exercise reveals the weakness of not having an alternative sophistication test. A finance professor who has a home worth 2 million dollars as a result of wise real estate investments but only $900,000 in other assets is not sophisticated enough to buy a private placement. But a blue collar worker or elderly widow who inherits a significant portfolio or wins the lottery qualifies. This test must be re-examined.

    .

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

    Ole0

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 03 Jan 2011 11:17:54 -0800 CFAW 2011 Annual Dinner Sponsorship Packages (12-15-10) http://iasbda.posterous.com/cfaw-2011-annual-dinner-sponsorship-packages http://iasbda.posterous.com/cfaw-2011-annual-dinner-sponsorship-packages ole0.bmp

    Please consider sponsoring or attending this year's event which promises to be a sold out gathering with a dynamic speaker at an interesting Washington Museum.We are open to additional sponsor possibilities if you have ideas for them and its a great place for entertaining or attracting clients.

    Sponsorship opportunities abound for the
    CFAW Annual Dinner: Tuesday, March 8, 2011
    Keynote Speaker: Sallie Krawcheck, President, Global Wealth and Investment Management, Bank of America
    Dear CFAW Supporter:
    The 2011 Annual Dinner is fast approaching. Our premiere networking event of the year, the Annual
    Dinner brings together more than 250 of Washington’s leading investment professionals and key decision
    makers. Our keynote speaker is Bank of America’s Sallie Krawcheck, a veteran of a broad range of
    senior executive positions in the financial services industry. She is well known in the industry for her
    honesty, candor, and integrity, as well as for being an engaging and humorous speaker.
    The venue is one of Washington’s landmarks - the National Museum for Women in the Arts. It is recognized
    as the only museum solely dedicated to celebrating the achievements of women in the visual,
    performing and literary arts. Listed on the Washington D.C. Inventory List of Historic Sites and the National
    Register of Historic Places, the original structure with its Tuscan and Mediterranean architectural
    elements dates back to 1908. Guests will enjoy strolling through the third floor gallery during the cocktail
    and dessert receptions.
    Don’t miss this opportunity to promote your company and support CFAW. Please review the many sponsorships
    available in the list below, and fill out and return the form on the back by January 14, to be
    sure your company is listed in the invitation.
    Continued on back >
    Main Event Sponsor $10,000
    Company name and logo on all event
    literature and CFAW website
    Company name and logo displayed at
    event
    Opportunity to distribute marketing
    materials at event
    Full-page ad in event program
    1 reserved table for 10 guests
    Dessert Reception Sponsor $5,000
    (non-exclusive, limited to 2)
    Company name and logo on all event
    literature and CFAW website
    Company name and logo displayed at
    event, specifically the dessert reception
    Half-page ad in event program
    4 admission tickets
    Cocktail Reception Sponsor $7,500
    ($5,000 non-exclusive, limited to 2)
    Company name and logo on all event
    literature and CFAW website
    Company name and logo displayed at
    event, specifically the cocktail reception
    Half-page ad in event program
    4 admission tickets
    Event Program Sponsor $4,000
    (non-exclusive, limited to 2)
    Full page ad on the inside cover of the
    event program
    Company name and logo on all event
    literature and CFAW website
    Company name displayed at event
    2 admission tickets
    I would like to reserve the following sponsorship(s) for the Annual Dinner on March 8, 2011:
    Main Event Sponsor $10,000
    Cocktail Reception Sponsor $7,500
    ($5,000 non-exclusive, limited to 2)
    Dessert Reception Sponsor $5,000
    (non-exclusive, limited to 2)
    Event Program Sponsor $4,000
    Valet Sponsor $4,000
    Floral Sponsor $3,000
    Wine Sponsor $3,000
    Table Sponsor $2,500
    (Sponsor listing on event materials
    and reserved table for 10 guests)
    Number of tables requested: ________
    (10 seats per table)
    Floral Sponsor $3,000
    Company name on all event literature
    and CFAW website
    Company name displayed at event
    2 admission tickets
    Wine Sponsor $3,000
    Company name on all event literature
    and CFAW website
    Company name displayed at event
    2 admission tickets
    Valet Sponsor $4,000
    Company name on all event literature
    and CFAW website
    Company name and logo displayed at
    valet station
    One-quarter-page ad in event program
    2 admission tickets
    Name:______________________________________
    Title:_______________________________________
    Company:___________________________________
    Address:____________________________________
    ___________________________________________
    Telephone:__________________________________
    Email:______________________________________
    Please return this form by fax or
    email to Anthony Pilnik at:
    Fax: 202.785.8949
    Email: Sponsorships@CFAWashington.org
    Annual Dinner Sponsorships (continued)
    CFA Society of Washington, D.C. E 1620 I Street, NW Suite 210 E Washington, DC 20006
    Phone: (888)718-3893 E Fax: (202)315-3332 E Email: Sponsorships@CFAWashington.org E www.cfawashington.org
    CFA Society of Washington, D.C. is a Section 501(c)(6) organization. Any contributions or gifts are not tax deductible as charitable contributions.

    Ole0

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Thu, 02 Dec 2010 10:48:47 -0800 Center for the Study of Financial Regulation Response http://iasbda.posterous.com/center-for-the-study-of-financial-regulation http://iasbda.posterous.com/center-for-the-study-of-financial-regulation A RESPONSE TO THE NAKED SHORT DISCUSSION
    http://business.nd.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic_Centers/Study_of_Financial_Regulation/pdf_and_documents/Finance%20Newsletter%20Fall%2010%209_21B.pdf/

    I) There are two sides to this issue
    Last issue’s discussion on naked shorting failed to acknowledge the serious debate about this issue among issuers, legislators and former regulators giving the impression that from an economic standpoint it was a harmless exercise in free market economics. It also confuses the legal nature of this practice using arguments well known on Wall Street in favor of less regulation. A recent thorough discussion of these points by Professor Douglas Branson is found at <http://www.virginialawbusrev.org/VLBR5-1pdfs/Branson.pdf> “hereafter “Branson”

    Short selling without a good faith locate is illegal and intentionally manipulating upwards the “supply” variable whether it be in the form of readily sellable legitimate shares or readily sellable mere “security entitlements” by simply “refusing to deliver” that which you sold after contracting to do just that by T+3 is a 10b-5 fraud.  There is a vast difference in between injecting liquidity and utilizing leverage. Arguments can be made that this should not be the law but there is no argument that it is the law. Many respected regulators and legislators believe this law should be tightened through a requirement to contractually agree to borrow or pre-borrow. “In the view of nearly every market participant naked short selling like the spread of false rumors is a hit out of bounds, not considered within the boundaries marking a level playing field”. Branson at p12.

    Contrary to the article’s assertion there are very clear distinctions between the market impact of naked and covered short sales. While the supply effects of naked short selling and covered short selling may be similar, the price effects in the equity markets are far different.  In a functioning price system, a price is a combination of scarcity, value and risk.  A legitimate short seller provides important information to the markets by (a) paying to borrow shares; (b) increasing the scarcity of loanable shares; (c) assuming risk (particularly in the form of a repurchase agreement).  A naked short seller does none of these things: he/she pays nothing to borrow shares, provides no information to the market by decrementing the loanable supply of an issue, and bears no risk If naked short sales are no different than covered short sales, why bother to borrow shares at all?  What incentive is there to legitimately borrow shares if naked short selling can be done without cost or risk. It is less costly to get a failed locate and therefore lenders seeking hedge fund trading business have an incentive to do so.  Borrowing costs are supposed to rise when the supply of legal borrows diminishes. This is a built-in anti-counterfeiting measure negated by naked shorting. See Boni on opportunistic short selling based on research as an SEC economist. <http://www.investigatethesec.com/drupal-5.5/files/Leslie%20Boni.pdf> .

    .

    II) The law is very clear on the issue

    The article suggests that these trades are not identifiable before settlement day but in fact the law requires them identified by a notation as to the locate requirement. There has been much debate over whether naked shorting was a cause of the sub-prime crisis. But that’s an attempt to say the law should change because it’s not effective. Numerous cases have been brought so far proving the point that absent the law opportunistic short selling is rampant. If you are in the business of lending stock and executing short sales such flexibility is obviously desirable .If you are the founder of small company seeing more shares traded then outstanding you have a different view. A particularly moving statement was made at an SEC roundtable on short selling by Dennis E. Nixon, Chairman of International Bancshares Corporation. Nixon noted how frustrating it was to watch more shares then outstanding trading while he was constrained as an issuer from saying anything about an obvious coordinated bear raid attack on his firm. <http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2009/roundtable-transcript-093009.pdf>.

    III) The SEC, Congress and many issuers are concerned and believe the only solution is a pre borrow requirement and not traffic ticket fines.

    There are therefore clearly opposing views on this topic that are readily available and should have been included. The article resorts to liquidity a well-worn argument used consistently by every hedge fund and prime broker in the world to minimize regulation. But SEC Chairmen from James Landis to Harvey Pitt to William Donaldson have asked directly or indirectly how much fraud are you willing to risk for liquidity. In 1937 Chairman Landis responded to the NYSE’s charge that regulation reduced liquidity by stating that he questioned the objectivity of exchange officials whose livelihood depended on creating the greatest possible share volume. The Transformation of Wall Street, 3rd Edition, Joel Seligman at p.147. Chairman Donaldson’s famous quote is found among other places  in John Welborn’s article on Phantom Shares, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv31n1/v31n1-7.pdf>

    Chairman Cox noted that short and distort schemes have drastic consequences.         Branson at fn 10. George Soros credits the fall of Lehman, Bear and AIG to short selling

    <http://www.georgesoros.com/articles-essays/entry/one_way_to_stop_bear_raids/>. See also Taibbi, Rolling Stone article dealing specifically with naked short selling and the subprime crisis. <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/12697/64824>

    The solution offered by many market participants is a pre-borrow requirement which forces short sellers to contractually agree to borrow as opposed to locate. Chairman Pitt has stated “Well, that's the problem. The theory is you're supposed to borrow the shares. But there are even some court cases that have held that where you sell shares short that you have no intention of buying that may not constitute fraud. So, there are some very strange decisions out there. And what was needed was a very simple and effective rule.If you sell a stock short, you must have a legally recognizable right to deliver the shares at the time that you engage in the short sale. That, to me, is the simplest solution to dealing with the naked shorting problem.” <http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/06/pitt-sarbanes-oxley-intelligent-investing-short.html>

     
    Senator Kaufman has made the same point and introduced legislation to support it
    <http://kaufman.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=58553367-af70-47f7-8308-d9ab25ae0842> . The letter was signed by Sens. Ted Kaufman (D-DE), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Carl Levin (D-MI), Jon Tester (D-MT), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and Robert Menendez (D-NJ).. The Dodd Frank bill requires a study on the incidence of failure to deliver shares sold short.Sec.417. Former Commissioner Roel Campos has written an extensive comment letter on the subject.

    <http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-30-08/s73008-108.pdf>. . See also letter from several issuers regarding Dr. Robert Shapiro’s study of the impact of naked shorting on the subprime crisis. <http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-3984.pdf>. and the European union led by Germany has moved aggressively in this area to require a pre borrow. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/short_selling/consultation_paper_en.pdf

     
    Finally the suggestion that increased fines is the answer is an invitation to opportunistic short sellers to weigh profits against the fine just as they now weigh profits against the cost of borrowing. See Branson at fn.14 .The fact is that locates and close outs have significantly reduced fails but abuse is still rampant during T+3 and that can only be cured by a pre-borrow as the euro nations have concluded.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Wed, 20 Oct 2010 10:30:38 -0700 File no.s7-22-10 Short Term Borrowing Disclosure. http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-nos7-22-10-short-term-borrowing-disclosu http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-nos7-22-10-short-term-borrowing-disclosu      The International Association of Small Broker Dealers and Advisors

    1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 210 Washington, DC 20006

    202-785-8940 ext. 108  

    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

    www.iasbda.com

    The International Association of Small Broker-Dealers and Advisers www.iasbda.com submits the following comments on the above referenced proposal. This proposal is long overdue as the abuse of repos to manipulate balance sheets has been known for a long time in the broker-dealer regulatory regime. We only wish to warn that this information can be misused by abusive short sellers and manipulators primarily against small firms. European regulators are acting aggressively in this regard. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/naked-short-sellers-derivatives-traders-face-european-union-restrictions.html. Short term borrowing can be characterized in different ways for different purposes. As Lehman and Bear deteriorated their inability to borrow short term was in the view of many the subject of abusive rumors. See http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7b58464d-67b7-4e4d-a0b7-29eff68f716f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5930344b-17ac-431b-8386-3af1dc6d280b/Colby.Portilla.PCRM.shortsales.article.sep-oct09.pdf and http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aB1jlqmFOTCA “Abusive short selling amounts to gasoline on the fire for distressed stocks and distressed markets,” said U.S. Senator Ted Kaufman <http://search.bloomberg.com/search?q=Ted+Kaufman&site=wnews&client=wnews&proxystylesheet=wnews&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&filter=p&getfields=wnnis&sort=date:D:S:d1>, a Delaware Democrat and one of the sponsors of a bill that would make the SEC restore the uptick rule. The regulation required traders to wait for a price increase in the stock they wanted to bet against; it prevented so-called bear raids, in which successive short sales forced prices down.

    Rumors about these firms inability to fund themselves over the short term were the most damaging to them. Our fear is that the small research and development firm that must rely continually on short term borrowings will be attacked by abusive short sellers using this disclosure. If Bear and Lehman could not defend against such rumors how can small firms defend against these tactics. But the Commission can take aggressive steps to insure that the disclosure is not so abused. Public statements by the commission and staff that negative comments will be scrutinized to be certain they are not accompanied by abusive rumors and naked shorting would be very useful. Indeed a statement that absent other evidence negative remarks should not be made about such disclosure. Public companies especially small public companies often cannot rebut such rumors because they are in a legally quiet period. This disclosure is not a simple solution. While good securities analysis should consider short term borrowing, its the characterization of such that can mean life or death for a small business. Exempting small businesses could be justified but they can handle this if they are not subject to abusive short selling for doing so. The release specifically asks for the impact on smaller reporting companies at p.41and provides a number of exceptions including an exception from quarterly reporting and a two year total borrowing requirement. We believe these are constructive attempts to help small companies. But we reiterate the need to protect this information from abuse by short sellers. Therefore we suggest that the staff specifically monitor such abuse for an initial time period of 3 years. The process is in place for doing so with the new whistleblower initiatives at the Commission and FINRA. The commission should establish a specific hot line for such information and aggressively investigate it. The staff should not make judgments based on the identity of the provider of the information. A 3 year study of such whistleblower complaints will inform the commission and staff of the real world costs of such disclosure and whether abusive short selling rumors persist.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Wed, 29 Sep 2010 06:51:03 -0700 IASBDA SENIOR CONSULTANT http://iasbda.posterous.com/iasbda-senior-consultant http://iasbda.posterous.com/iasbda-senior-consultant        Mike Armelin a former colleague at the NASD is available for BD AND IA audits and investigations either as an employee or consultant. His extensive FINRA experience would be ideal for a multiple branch office audit.I have known Mike for 35 years and would highly recommend him .Please contact us at pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com for more information on Mike .202-785-8940 ex 108.                   

                     MICHAEL J. ARMELIN, MBA                               

    michael.armelin@gmail.com <mailto:michael.armelin@gmail.com>

    www.linkedin.com/in/michaelarmelin

                                           

                             

                                           

    PROFILE

    Experienced broker-dealer enforcement investigator/project manager with extensive experience supporting examination and sales practice programs carried out regarding broker-dealers and investment advisors. Self-motivated with a proven track record of completing a variety of detailed special projects and reports for senior management.  Adept at promoting the visibility of regulatory efforts and creating performance metrics to support decision making. Capabilities include:

    On-site review of broker-dealer sales practices  Examination of investment advisors     Analysis of policies, procedures and controls Research compliance issues       
    Validate securities trading data Examination of books and records  Create metrics to evaluate and track departmental productivity       Review initial aftermarket & other trading data Determine compliance with rules & regulations Identification of significant, novel sales practices and fraud cases     

    PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

    FINRA - Washington, DC  (1991 - 2010)                       Additional Roles with FINRA included:
    Assistant Director, Department of Enforcement                -Assistant Director, Member Regulation

                           -Regional Coordinator, Member Regulation

                           -Senior Examiner, Member Regulation-NY

                                                         

                                  

                          EDUCATION

                            MBA, American University - Washington, DC
                            BS, Mount St. Mary’s University - Emmitsburg, MD

                          TARGET ROLES

                          ·       Fraud Investigations                            Research Analyst
                          ·       Broker-Dealer Compliance                        Enforcement Project Manager

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Tue, 07 Sep 2010 09:51:02 -0700 CFAW-GIC First Annual Investment and Regulatory Conference, September 23, 9am http://iasbda.posterous.com/cfaw-gic-first-annual-investment-and-regulato http://iasbda.posterous.com/cfaw-gic-first-annual-investment-and-regulato    

     

    CFAW logo w/ Capitol at night
    Investment & Regulatory Conference 
    August 27, 2010   

    First Annual CFAW-GIC Washington Investment and Regulation Conference 

    September 23, 2010, 9:00am - 1:00pm 

    GIC logo           2010 NABE Conference
    Location: Arnold & Porter, LLP
                    555 12th Street, NW
                    Washington, DC 20004
    Join CFA Society of Washington, DC and the Global Interdependence Center in this first annual conference focusing on financial regulatory reform and the forthcoming 2010 mid-term elections.  GIC and CFAW, along with the CFA Institute, are partnering to hold the First Annual CFAW-GIC Washington Investment and Regulation Conference at the law offices of Arnold & Porter.  The conference will precede the start of the 2010 Society Leaders Conference, which brings together CFA society leaders from around the world.

    9:00 -9:15am: Welcome and Introduction
    Speaker: Roel C. Campos, Partner Cooley, Godward, Kronish, LLP and former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission

    9:15-10:30: Financial Regulatory Reform Panel Discussion 

    David Freeman - Partner, Arnold & Porter, LLP
  • Jim Allen - Head of Capital Markets Policy, CFA Institute
  • Alex Pollock-Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
  • James Angel, PhD - Professor, Georgetown University
  • Matt Moran-Vice President Business Development, CBOE
  • Carlotta King - Assistant General Counsel, Managed Funds Association

    10:30 am - 11:45 am: How Will These Developments Affect the Investment Cycle? - Panel Discussion

    Frank Hathaway - Chief Economist, NASDAQ/OMX
  • Michael Farr - President, Farr Miller, LLC
  • Shawn Dubravac - Chief Economist, Consumer Electronics Association and current CFAW President
  • Dave Resler- Chief Economist, Nomura Securities
  • Peter Tanous-President & CEO, Lynx Investment Advisory

    12:00 pm - 1:00 pm: Luncheon
    Keynote Speaker:
    Senator Ted Kaufman (D-DE)

    Click Here to Register.

    Back to Top 

    Future CFA Society of Washington Events

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 16 Aug 2010 07:45:47 -0700 File no.4-605-Petition Request for rulemaking to exempt securities offerings up to $100,000 with $100 maximum per investor from registration http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no4-605-petition-request-for-rulemaking http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-no4-605-petition-request-for-rulemaking

    This petition proposal is worthy of serious consideration because of its simplicity and potential benefit. Many businesses can be started with a small sliver of equity. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703720504575376664285510930.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_RIGHTTopCarousel_1  .See http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf for rulemaking petition.

    However it may be more useful to adopt a targeted offering registration in order to allow the states to also accept it. We can envision  a short registration document that included a set of unaudited financials, a five page business plan and a list of officers and current owners that is filed with both the states and the SEC and reviewed by the SEC'S Small Business Office. While this may entail excessive SEC resources we think significant reliance on the states is appropriate. But the real benefit would be to bring into the open what is clearly already going on at even a higher level. A 10 page document with significant warnings about potential losses and lack of liquidity that is on file at the federal and state level would also provide needed information about this micro market. We expect that this would be a direct offering until the commission addresses the finder issue and provides some relief in that regard. providing finder relief in this context would be useful There is no doubt that unscrupulous individuals would abuse this process but we think that is happening already. We have noted before the need to raise capital in these difficult economic times and as the comments suggest this would be a useful methodology for the small business community. While we would also support the exemption requested we think the small documentation suggested is a more effective way to accomplish the goals intended. There is a need for a sense of proportionality in the small business capital raising function. We think as the authors do that a maximum loss of $100 per person allows for some flexibility in government regulation and with the filings and notice that regulation can come after the fact.

    Those of us who have frequently attended the yearly small business forum can attest to the yearly frustration over the issue of finders and other small changes to the regulatory system. Promises are continually made and the following year a new staff member will reiterate the same promise. This independent proposal can be a focal point for encouraging the commission's attention to the need for small business flexibility and should be incorporated into a formal rulemaking procedure.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Thu, 12 Aug 2010 09:40:54 -0700 DF Title IV - Accredited Investor Standard: http://iasbda.posterous.com/df-title-iv-accredited-investor-standard http://iasbda.posterous.com/df-title-iv-accredited-investor-standard From:   Peter Chepucavage 
    Sent:   Wednesday, August 04, 2010 3:38 PM
    To:     'rule-comments@sec.gov'
    Subject:        DF Title IV - Accredited Investor Standard:

     

    The new standard excludes personal residences from the net worth test of an accredited investor. There has been some discussion in the media about the effect of mortgages on a personal residence and the corporate finance department stated as follows in CDI 179.01 and 255.47

     The new CDI reads:

    Question: Under Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the net worth standard for an accredited investor, as set forth in Securities Act Rules 215 and 501(a)(5), is adjusted to delete from the calculation of net worth the "value of the primary residence" of the investor. How should the "value of the primary residence" be determined for purposes of calculating an investor's net worth?

    Answer: Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act does not define the term "value," nor does it address the treatment of mortgage and other indebtedness secured by the residence for purposes of the net worth calculation. As required by Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission will issue amendments to its rules to conform them to the adjustment to the accredited investor net worth standard made by the Act.

    However, Section 413(a) provides that the adjustment is effective upon enactment of the Act. When determining net worth for purposes of Securities Act Rules 215 and 501(a)(5), the value of the person's primary residence must be excluded. Pending implementation of the changes to the Commission's rules required by the Act, the related amount of indebtedness secured by the primary residence up to its fair market value may also be excluded. Indebtedness secured by the residence in excess of the value of the home should be considered a liability and deducted from the investor's net worth. [July 23, 2010]

    This interpretation does not clarify indebtedness that may have been invested in another asset class and whether that must be excluded  as part of net worth. An example would be a second trust taken out 5 years ago and invested in a vacation home that has appreciated in value. We suggest that the correct answer is that the second trust must be excluded from the value of the second home or whatever asset was purchased. But this may not be necessary under the CDI and legislation and may be difficult to calculate. The staff should provide clear guidance on whether such debt must always be offset since its not offset if spent other ways. In other words if you squander it there is no deduction under the CDI for the related amount of indebtedness secured by the primary residence up to its fair market value . But if you invest it wisely there may be? Such a reading would seem to penalize the investor unfairly.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Tue, 03 Aug 2010 13:02:11 -0700 File Number 4-606 study Regarding Brokers, Dealers and Investment Advisers http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-number-4-606-study-regarding-brokers-dea http://iasbda.posterous.com/file-number-4-606-study-regarding-brokers-dea

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

     -----Original Message-----
    From:   Peter Chepucavage 
    Sent:   Tuesday, August 03, 2010 4:00 PM
    To:     'rule-comments@sec.gov'
    Cc:     brad smith; brock; 'Frank. Mcauliffe (E-mail)
    Subject:        File Number 4-606 study Regarding Brokers, Dealers and Investment Advisers

     

    We respectfully suggest that the issue here is not the standard of care but the standard of disclosure to retail customers as to what financial services they are receiving. The Commission has tried to solve this issue in the past only to be rebuffed by the courts but it now has full authority to do so in a simple way. Customers need to understand whether they are purchasing executions or advice. They need to understand whether its a one night stand or a relationship. They do not understand that now. We believe that three simple principles could clarify and solve the problem. The commission should:

    1) make very clear that unsolicited transactions especially internet trades are not subject to either suitability of fiduciary duty.

    2) insist that using the word adviser /advisor requires a fiduciary duty
    3) insist that customers acknowledge that a trade is unsolicited and that they are not getting financial advice for a special fee or else the fiduciary duty requirement applies and the seller must register as an investment adviser. Additional disclosures that might be useful would include "we don't pay you for margin account stock loans and we may facilitate short sales in stocks we heavily recommend." Those actions should also raise serious questions under the fiduciary standard for advisers affiliated with brokers..

    Retail customers today especially those facing near term retirement have the most discretionary wealth for investment. But their decisions are also the most consequential as they face a significant shortfall in retirement and complex healthcare decisions along with declining or stagnant real estate investments. Issues like reverse mortgages and annuities are more complex then the financial decisions of their parents. This may suggest that the rules in this regard be different for individuals over 50 years of age.

    But most importantly the Commission should try to simplify the message that customers receive when they engage a broker or adviser. We think most customers want a relationship but may not want to pay for it, just as most psychiatric patients need therapy but drugs are cheaper and less time consuming for the therapist. Brokerage execution is cheaper than brokerage advice but too many customers do not understand the difference and too many brokers do not explain it. Our point is that these customers and brokers do not care about the standard but instead the service. The customer may need broker time and the broker needs executions. Of course many large brokers are shipping the less than $100,000 asset customers to call centers where these explanations are surely more limited.

    We believe that most members of the financial services industry are honorable but are also stretched by certain regulatory policies intended to reduce costs but which must of necessity reduce services. See the Grant Thornton study in this area.

    www.GrantThornton.com/IPO <http://www.GrantThornton.com/IPO>.  In this regard we do not believe there are many suitability or fiduciary cases out there but the Commission should disclose them in this rulemaking. A comparison of these cases to the recently announced subprime crisis settlements against big firms would be instructive. The number of cases in relation to the reduction in execution costs/broker profits is a subject especially worthy of study and especially sensitive to small bd's and advisers. The time honored phrase comes to mind;" you get what you pay for". Customers must therefore understand that if you want an adviser to study your entire financial situation including your nursing home future you must pay for it.

    Having said this we also note that discretionary accounts at brokers should not be subject to adviser registration for the same reason-customers paying only commissions are not paying for advice and this service should be available as long as its adequately disclosed. Some customers like this concept and they should be allowed to use it as long as they are told that the only thing the broker does is to manage a certain amount of money and not do the financial analysis done by an IA..We suspect that the staff will learn nothing new with this study but that intense pressure will be applied to avoid the disclosures listed above. One alternative way to view this problem is to allow the customer to choose where he wants to be with enforced disclosure. Today its too often the broker who forces the customer into the bd regime when the customer may want to be in the IA regime and may think he is. The goal of the study and the rulemaking should be that every customer makes a conscious choice of who his financial doctor will be.

    Finally the Commission must not overlook the pricing pressures it has imposed on small bd's and advisers while asking them to adopt a fiduciary standard. Cheap executions and intense regulation do not equal comprehensive financial counseling. It reminds of the famous Viet Nam phrase -"we had to destroy the village in order to save it." This issue is rarely if ever addressed in discussions about the appropriate standard. Competition is necessary unless  we want all middle class investors directed toward a call center. The Commission should therefore be prudent in imposing standards on small brokers and advisers fighting to survive and consider the need for a vibrant small firm financial services community. See the intense debate for the small member seats on Finra's board of governors. http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100730/FREE/100739987/-1/INDaily01.

    Investment News has also reported extensively on the declining number of small brokers. http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100627/REG/306279981.  Small brokers and advisers are vital to the serious financial advice needed by those facing retirement.They should not be disadvantaged by a blanket desire to make everyone a fiduciary.If a customer wants a fiduciary he has to pay for that service and understand the difference.

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Wed, 07 Jul 2010 13:02:41 -0700 Limiting the Paul Anka Finder's Exemption. http://iasbda.posterous.com/limiting-the-paul-anka-finders-exemption http://iasbda.posterous.com/limiting-the-paul-anka-finders-exemption The Division of Trading and Markets issued the following finder letter to Brumberg, Mackey & Wall, P.L.C. May 17, 2010 and unfortunately in our view again chose not to clarify its previous positions in this area. The letter focuses on the representation that non-securities lawyers would refer interested clients to an issuer but would not engage in a sales effort. The staff noted that the introduction of only those persons who had an interest in investing implies pre-screening and pre-selling. As noted below Anka was allowed because he had a reasonable belief in their accredited investor status but no personal contact with the investors. This would appear to distinguish Anka on personal contact but there is no reference to Anka in the request or denial. Based upon other statements by the staff we think they have concluded that transaction based compensation alone requires bd registration and they should say that directly.See especially fn 3 of the recent letter.We respect the position but do not understand why it cannot be clarified. A personal contact would appear to be as little as a country club discussion where the finder says to an affluent friend "I gave your name to someone with a good investment idea". Putting aside the difficulty in enforcing such a subjective test, the small business capital raising function should not depend on the continuing lack of clear and precise guidelines. Small business should not have to hire lawyers to read through 30 years of letters as they struggle to survive.We note that ironically the officers and directors of the issuer are free to make this approach but not free to pay for a referral. The staff should follow the recommendation of the SEC's Small Business Forum and ABA Task Force with regard to private placement brokers. 'http://sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor28.pdf   page 15.This same recommendation has been made at the Forum every year in one form or another over the last 10 years.The no act letter is at

    http://sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2010/brumbergmackey051710.pdf   Cf. Paul Anka, 1991 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P79,797 (avail. July 24, 1991): A 1.8 percent shareholder entered into an agreement with a Canadian hockey team to provide the Canadian team with the names of prospective purchasers of its limited partnership units. Each prospective purchaser would be a person that the shareholder reasonably believes to be an accredited person as that term is used in Regulation D. In reliance on Rule 3a4-1, directors, officers, or employees of the hockey team then could approach potential investors

    Anka agreed to furnish the Senators with the names and telephone numbers of persons in the United States and Canada whom he believed might be interested in purchasing the limited partnership units.  Anka would neither personally contact these persons nor make any recommendations to them regarding investments in the Senators.  It is noteworthy that in Mr. Anka's original proposal letter to the SEC he would have made the initial contact with prospective investors, but the SEC would not issue a no-action letter under those facts.  In exchange for his services, Anka would be paid a finder's fee equal to 10 percent of any sales traceable to his efforts.  Important factors identified in the Anka letter include:

            §       Mr. Anka had a bona fide, pre-existing business or personal relationship with these prospective investors.

            §       He reasonably believed those investors to be accredited.

            §       He would not advertise, endorse or solicit investors.

            §       He would have no personal contact with prospective investors.

            §       Only officers and directors of the Senators would contact the potential investors.

            §       Compensation paid to the Senators' officers and directors would comply with 1934 Act Rule 3a4-1 (governing compensation to issuer's agents).

            §       He would not provide financing for any investors.

          • He would not advise on valuation

            §       He would not perform due diligence on the Senators' offering.

          • He had never been a broker-dealer or registered representative of a broker-dealer.

            See http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60149.pdf for the Commission's recent but infrequent enforcement of this issue where it also failed to clarify/distinguish the Anka fact pattern.

            .

            Peter J.Chepucavage
            Executive Director,CFAW
            General Counsel
            Plexus Consulting LLC
            1620 I St. N.W.
            Washington,D.C.20006
            202-785-8940 ex 108
            www.plexusconsulting.com
            www.iasbda.com
            pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 21 Jun 2010 08:02:30 -0700 Shining a light on the naked short seller - Washington Times http://iasbda.posterous.com/shining-a-light-on-the-naked-short-seller-was http://iasbda.posterous.com/shining-a-light-on-the-naked-short-seller-was
    Outlook

    http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/18/shining-a-light-on-the-naked-short-seller/ 

    The attached discussion highlights and updates the current debate regarding abusive short selling by noting 3 remedies all of which Wall Street has opposed.The alternative tick test,the pre-borrow and more real time disclosure.But countries around the world are acting to prohibit abusive short selling while the financial press without fail refers to these actions as anti-short selling.There can be only two explanations for this;either the press does not understand or they want to deliberately conflate the two.We also do not believe the press recognizes that the whole world is concerned about this issue because you rarely see actions by other countries described in a positive light.The recent German action against naked short selling was described as if it were something radically beyond what is already illegal in the U.S.But the Germans simply added a pre-borrow. We don't see the Germans as radical regulators and we believe that like many issues,the U.S. can and should choose the best of world wide regulatory efforts.

     

    JOHNSON: Shining a light on the naked short seller

    It appears that U.S. political will for financial reform will fall short of requiring that short sellers first pre-borrow the stocks they sell short. Despite our own fears of banning so-called naked short selling, Germany banned the practice in May in some of its financial stocks. Germany is considering whether to extend the ban to all stocks, and other EU exchanges are eyeing similar initiatives.

    True to form, many leading U.S. financial publications have railed against this approach to ending naked short-selling abuses, labeling it a "ban" on all short selling. Unfortunately, their efforts and those of Wall Street's lobbyists seem to be succeeding: U.S. politicians and regulators give no sign they are considering these sensible measures being adopted in the European Union. That's regrettable.

    To be clear, while a ban on naked short selling is a good idea, a ban on legitimate short selling is not. Legitimate short selling - in which a short seller sells a share he has borrowed or at least located to borrow - is a critical component of efficient price discovery in the stock market. To ban legitimate short selling would be like banning left turns for cars. But naked short selling - in which a short seller sells a share he does not own, has not borrowed or even located to borrow - is something quite different. Because of the nature of the trade-settlement system in the U.S., current rules allow prime brokers and large institutional traders to sell stock short without first borrowing it.

    A pre-borrow requirement in the United States would put an end to naked-short-selling abuses in the U.S. as it has in Germany with respect to the covered stocks. Absent a pre-borrow requirement, naked short selling no doubt will continue to plague American markets, as we saw in the dislocations of 2008 and as recently as the one-day minicrash on May 6.

    Even with rule changes implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the fall of 2008, as recently as April the average net fails-to-deliver per day at the stock clearinghouse were 400 million shares - with a daily worth of $1.5 billion. Many of these fails are the result of naked short sales, and contrary to popular belief, they are not all in penny stocks or foreign stocks. While Russell 3000 stocks are 5 percent of the daily fail volume in the United States, they account for 20 percent of the value of these fails. Similarly, exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, account for roughly 5 percent of the volume of fails, but they are more than 50 percent of the average daily fails value.

    Unfortunately, the SEC's 2008 rule changes cannot prevent a resumption of the huge and destructive fail-to-deliver volumes reached in the summer of 2008. On one day in July 2008, fails-to-deliver exceeded 2.2 trillion shares. These problems will persist and compound until naked short selling is eliminated from our markets through a pre-borrow requirement.

    That said, if the political will only allows for something less than pre-borrow, then let's at least do something meaningful. One alternative under discussion deserves every consideration regulators and Congress can muster. I refer to the real-time reporting of short and long volume without disclosing the identity of the long or short seller.

    Currently, U.S. exchanges report trading activity in real time but do not disclose whether trades are short or long. Real-time disclosure of actual short and long sales would allow investors and analysts to incorporate meaningful data into market- and security-specific analyses. Such disclosure also would add considerable support to the SEC's proposal to have a consolidated audit trail for all trades. Furthermore, public and instantaneous trade transparency would help legitimate short sellers and other Wall Street institutions dispel doubts about short selling. A real-time disclosure proposal also has the general support of many of the exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

    Finally, this real-time disclosure alternative is cheap, easy and efficient. Traders are already required to mark trade tickets short or long, so the technology is in place that would allow trades to be reported as "short," "market maker short," "buy" or "buy-to-cover" in real time through the Consolidated Tape electronic data system. Moreover, this subtle change wouldn't require a new regulatory apparatus. If the SEC (or Congress) amended the Regulation National Market System, this new disclosure rule could be implemented tomorrow.

    When regulation fails (or when a lobby is too powerful), sometimes sunshine is the best disinfectant. It's time to open the windows on Wall Street and let in the sunshine.

    Jonathan E. Johnson III is the president of Overstock.com.

    © Copyright 2010 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Mon, 14 Jun 2010 08:15:00 -0700 Real Time Marking and Reporting of Short Sales http://iasbda.posterous.com/real-time-marking-and-reporting-of-short-sale http://iasbda.posterous.com/real-time-marking-and-reporting-of-short-sale

    We believe the enclosed proposal has great merit and ask that you support it by letter to the Chairman's office if you agree. We would also be interested in knowing what the downside if any would be. While progress has been made in abusive short selling we think this proposal is a winner for all. Thank you for your support.

    ole0.bmp

    June 14, 2010

    The Honorable Mary L. Schapiro
    Chairman
    Securities and Exchange Commission
    100 F Street, NE
    Washington, DC 20549-1090

    Dear Chairman Schapiro,
    While the SEC recently enacted a modified version of the so-called “uptick rule,” I believe that the SEC should do more to protect investors and issuers from abusive market manipulation.  I am particularly concerned about naked short selling and large and persistent fail-to-deliver positions which continue to harm issuers, investors and market integrity. When you directed an SEC working group to study how to improve the audit trail of short sale executions, you recognized that the revised uptick rule by itself is not enough. As you noted, improving the audit trail would establish the expedient tracking of short sale executions to origination.

    I urge the SEC to adopt rules that require the exchanges and all trading platforms to report total short and long volume through the Consolidated Tape in real time as a simple and inexpensive means to promote needed transparency in the markets.  

    This simple requirement would help the SEC to regulate by bringing sunlight to a dark area. As you know, aggregate volume is already reported in real time.  Prompt reporting of aggregate long and short trading volume by security will accomplish the following:

      ·       Congress, the SEC and other regulators will be able to monitor, assess, and respond to market events and discourage manipulative trading.

      ·       Investors and analysts will better understand stock activity and stock prices.
      ·       Issuers will be able to reply with more certainty to questions about the nature of trading in their stock. 
      ·       Wall Street firms and hedge funds will be able to use this short volume data to dispel any inaccurate myths regarding short sellers and short sales. 

      ·       Academics will have more complete and timely data with which to analyze market microstructure.

    Importantly, this requirement would not reveal or compromise individual traders’ positions and strategies. 
    This request can be accomplished without new legislation through the SEC’s existing authority by amending SEC Regulation NMS to require that all trades printed to the Tape be marked “short”, “market maker short”, “buy” or “buy-to-cover.”  It is critical that this requirement apply to trades on all exchanges.

    The cost to implement real time reporting on the Tape is minimal because currently SEC Regulation SHO requires that all trades be reported  short/long, so this information is already collected by the exchanges at time of execution.  As Michael Gitlin of T. Rowe Price told the SEC short selling roundtable last year:

    •  

      The real time tagging and display of short sale executions on the consolidated Tape would provide market participants with a more in-depth understanding of trading activities in any given security on any given day.  By marking short sale executions as short on the consolidated Tape, we are creating an equal and fair marketplace whereby long sales would necessarily be recognized as having been sold long . . . We believe the benefits of the Consolidated Tape reporting for short sales outweigh any additional costs.

    Given the severity of the economic crisis that resulted from the emergence and manipulation of exotic and opaque trading practices, there should not be serious objections to more transparency and information for investors, issuers, regulators, Congress and academics.  Options activity, both puts and calls, is already disclosed to the market at the time of trade.  Retail trades (short/long) are known to brokerage firms at time of execution.  Real time tagging and disclosure of short and long sales by ticker would level the playing field for all investors.  Additionally, short and long sale disclosure by ticker is less onerous than short sale disclosure by firm (or client), a rule the SEC is currently weighing.

    While some argue that opponents of abusive short selling wish to treat short selling differently than long buying, that is not my purpose. In fact, it is just the opposite.  I advocate short reporting be done the same as long reporting.  The SEC should require full transparency for both, especially in volatile or crash markets. The recent flash crash is troubling not only because of its size, but more importantly because neither regulators nor investors understand it. The possibility that short selling could have played a part in the flash crash requires the full and real-time transparency for which I am advocating.

    Issuers who were severely impacted should know the dynamics of long and short selling. Investors should know whether large amounts of aggressive short selling are legitimate or abusive. The disclosure I am advocating would allow the private sector to join with the regulators in their enforcement efforts. It may also allow private sector issuers to alert the SEC to unusual patterns, including naked short selling coupled with rumor mongering. Those closest to a stock may be able to spot subtle trading pattern differences and inform regulators and/or initiate civil action. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 4th at page C1 the testimony of certain veteran traders at the recent SEC roundtable on high speed trading:

    •  

      “Some fast-moving computer-driven investment firms are getting an edge by trading on market data before it gets to other investors, according to market players and researchers who have studied the trading. The firms gain that advantage by buying data from stock exchanges and feeding it into supercomputers that calculate stock prices a fraction of a second before most other investors see the numbers. That lets these traders shave pennies per share from trades, which when multiplied by thousands of trades can earn the firms big profits.”  See also <http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10808036>.

    Some of these veteran traders went so far as to test and prove their theories by various bait and trap initiatives with counter parties. Clearly, the private sector can be helpful when it has information about suspicious trading patterns.

    I therefore ask the SEC to initiate promptly a rulemaking proceeding to require real time reporting by the exchanges and all trading platforms of short and long sales through the Consolidated Tape.

    Thank you for your consideration and your continuing efforts to address abusive short selling.

    Sincerely,

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

    Ole0

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    http://files.posterous.com/user_profile_pics/23465/peter.jpg http://posterous.com/users/KETd4p2YbT Peter Chepucavage IASBDA Peter Chepucavage
    Tue, 11 May 2010 06:19:48 -0700 short selling and the plunge= unlimited fear http://iasbda.posterous.com/short-selling-and-the-plunge-unlimited-fear http://iasbda.posterous.com/short-selling-and-the-plunge-unlimited-fear

    We have argued for some time that current short selling rules would be ineffective in a crisis and last week we seem to have had one. Much selling occurred very rapidly and we question whether the locate rule was the first priority for those involved in the high speed selling. Yet the reaction seems extraordinary to us when viewed in the context of past arguments that short selling should no more be limited than long selling. In other words if last week's spike was upward rather than downward would the SEC have scheduled today's meeting or the House subcommittee scheduled tomorrow's hearings. Indeed we had a huge upward spike at today's open and everyone was fine. We submit that downward plunges in today's environment are viewed very differently than they have been. A few months ago the Commission split on the application of a circuit breaker test for the imposition of an alternative tick test. But today the Chair of the Commission released the following statement;

    "This morning, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro had a constructive meeting with the leaders of six exchanges - the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, BATS, Direct Edge, ISE and CBOE - and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to discuss the causes of Thursday's market events, the potential contributing factors, and possible market reforms."As a first step, the parties agreed on a structural framework, to be refined over the next day, for strengthening circuit breakers and handling erroneous trades."

    Senator Kaufman has warned for many months that high speed trading was an unknown and dangerous new element in our system and the plunge seems to have confirmed his fears. But  circuit breakers can only postpone the actions of aggressive high speed short sellers who balance immediate profits against monetary fines imposed years later. We argue again that a pre-borrow or hard borrow is a better limitation tool than circuit breakers that produce temporary relief but huge uncertainty. It would therefore be important for the Commission and Congress to find out how much of the plunge was short selling and how much of that was without the required locate. We understand that the first response from many will be there is no evidence that short selling caused the plunge and our response would be lets find out how much occurred and then determine impact. A fundamental premise about naked short selling is that it can flood the market with extra shares at a time when the market may be sensitive to other downside worries.It is in other words unlimited. We submit the Commission and Congress owe the investing public the assurance that abusive short selling was not a factor and that transparency of high speed trading is very important.This assurance is especially important because some are already suggesting a manipulation http://www.aim.org/aim-column/manipulation-not-error-behind-market-plunge/ George Soros has made the point that unlimted short selling should not be allowed in either the stock or bond market and the plunge may also confirm his reasoning because of the natural human fear that it had no limits.In the debate between risk and uncertainty this is clearly uncertainty:

    Up until the crash of 2008, the prevailing view -- called the efficient market hypothesis -- was that the prices of financial instruments accurately reflect all the available information (i.e. the underlying reality). But this is not true. Financial markets don't deal with the current reality, but with the future -- a matter of anticipation, not knowledge. Thus, we must understand financial markets through a new paradigm which recognizes that they always provide a biased view of the future, and that the distortion of prices in financial markets may affect the underlying reality that those prices are supposed to reflect. (I call this feedback mechanism "reflexivity.")

    The first step is to acknowledge that being long and selling short in the stock market has an asymmetric risk/reward profile. Losing on a long position reduces one's risk exposure, while losing on a short position increases it. As a result, one can be more patient being long and wrong than being short and wrong. This asymmetry discourages short-selling.

    The second step is to recognize that the CDS market offers a convenient way of shorting bonds, but the risk/reward asymmetry works in the opposite way. Going short on bonds by buying a CDS contract carries limited risk but almost unlimited profit potential. By contrast, selling CDS offers limited profits but practically unlimited risks. This asymmetry encourages speculating on the short side, which in turn exerts a downward pressure on the underlying bonds. The negative effect is reinforced by the fact that CDS are tradable and therefore tend to be priced as warrants, which can be sold at anytime, not as options, which would require an actual default to be cashed in. People buy them not because they expect an eventual default, but because they expect the CDS to appreciate in response to adverse developments.AIG thought it was selling insurance on bonds, and as such, they considered CDS outrageously overpriced. In fact, it was selling bear-market warrants and it severely underestimated the risk.

    The third step is to recognize reflexivity, which means that the mispricing of financial instruments can affect the fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of financial institutions, whose ability to do business is so dependent on trust. A decline in their share and bond prices can increase their financing costs. That means that bear raids on financial institutions can be self-validating.

    Taking these three considerations together, it's clear that AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others were destroyed by bear raids in which the shorting of stocks and buying CDS mutually amplified and reinforced each other. The unlimited shorting of stocks was made possible by the abolition of the uptick rule, which would have hindered bear raids by allowing short selling only when prices were rising. The unlimited shorting of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. The two made a lethal combination. And AIG failed to understand this. http://www.georgesoros.com/articles-essays/entry/one_way_to_stop_bear_raids/

    Peter J.Chepucavage
    Executive Director,CFAW
    General Counsel
    Plexus Consulting LLC
    1620 I St. N.W.
    Washington,D.C.20006
    202-785-8940 ex 108
    www.plexusconsulting.com
    www.iasbda.com
    pchepucavage@plexusconsulting.com

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